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Current policy initiatives taken by the EU and the OECD aim at abolishing preferential 
corporate tax regimes. This note extends Keen's (2001) analysis of symmetric capital tax 
competition under preferential (or discriminatory) and non-discriminatory tax regimes to 
allow for countries of different size. Even though size asymmetries imply a redistribution of 
tax revenue from the larger to the smaller country, a non-discrimination policy is found to 
have similar effects as in the symmetric model: it lowers the average rate of capital taxation 
and thus makes tax competition more aggressive in both the large and the small country. 
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October 2006 1 Introduction
One of the main current policy issues in corporate taxation is the abolition of preferen-
tial tax regimes. Many countries grant tax preferences to foreign-based multinational
¯rms in order to attract internationally mobile tax bases, while simultaneously main-
taining a higher e®ective rate of taxation for less mobile domestic ¯rms.1 This practice
of `ring-fencing' the domestic tax base has come under heavy attack from both the
OECD and the European Commission. The OECD (1998, 2000) has issued a blacklist
of predominantly small tax havens, which have been induced to discontinue granting
speci¯c tax preferences to foreign-based multinational ¯rms. At the same time, the
European Union has identi¯ed a total of 66 discriminatory measures, mostly taken
by small EU countries and associated territories, which are to be phased out by 2008
(Primarolo Report, 1999).
From a theoretical point of view it is unclear, however, whether these measures are
indeed desirable from a global economic e±ciency perspective. In particular, it is feared
that overall tax competition might be intensi¯ed when countries are forced to abolish
tax preferences, which are primarily targeted at multinational ¯rms. This is most clearly
expressed in the analysis of Keen (2001), who shows that when two symmetric countries
compete for two di®erent tax bases, both of which are internationally mobile (albeit to
a di®erent degree), the restriction to employ a single tax rate on both tax bases will
unambiguously reduce tax revenues in each country. Later work has quali¯ed Keen's
result and has shown that a ban on tax preferences need not be revenue-reducing if
either the size of the two tax bases is not given for the two countries taken together
(Janeba and Smart, 2003), or if investors in each country exhibit a home bias (Haupt
and Peters, 2005).2 Nevertheless, Keen's result is still a forceful one.
All the above-mentioned contributions assume, however, that the two competing coun-
1The reduced tax burden of multinational ¯rms is documented in a recent study by Hines (2005).
Using ¯rm-speci¯c data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Hines shows (Table 1) that the
e®ective pro¯t tax burden of U.S.-based multinationals has, on average, fallen more strongly since the
1980s than the nominal corporate income tax rates of the host countries. This ¯nding indicates either
that U.S. multinationals have bene¯tted from discriminatory tax breaks or that they have been able
to shift pro¯ts to tax havens (or a combination of both).
2Recently, Bucovetsky and Hau°er (2006) have considered a model where ¯rms can invest in a
multinational structure that allows them to bene¯t from tax preferences. In this setting the welfare
e®ects of restricting tax preferences depend critically on the elasticity with which ¯rms change their
organizational form in response to tax incentives.
1tries are identical in all respects.3 Given the evidence that preferential tax regimes are
primarily used by small countries this is clearly an important restriction. A well-known
result from the literature on asymmetric tax competition for a single tax base is that
small countries will undercut their larger neighbors, and may even be better o® un-
der tax competition as compared to a situation where countries can fully coordinate
their tax rates (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991; Kanbur and Keen, 1993).4 It is thus
a natural question to ask whether large countries - the principal supporters of the pol-
icy initiatives referred to above - may gain from the abolition of tax preferences, by
restricting the ability of small countries to compete with them on unequal terms.
In this short paper we combine Keen's (2001) analysis of discriminatory vs. non-
discriminatory tax competition with the analysis of tax competition between countries
of di®erent size. We show that the smaller country unambiguously has lower tax rates,
but higher per-capita tax revenue, under either restricted or unrestricted tax com-
petition. However, imposing a non-discrimination constraint hurts not only the small
country, but also the large one. Hence Keen's (2001) result turns out to be robust with
respect to the introduction of size asymmetries between countries.
2 The model with di®erentiated taxation
We consider two countries i 2 fA;Bg which compete over two capital tax bases. The
share of country i in the world population is si and, by convention, we let country A be
the smaller of the two countries (so that sA · 0:5 and sB ¸ 0:5). There are two distinct
capital tax bases n 2 f1;2g, which di®er in their degree of international mobility.
One interpretation is that the ¯rst base captures the pro¯ts of large, multinational
¯rms, which can easily shift pro¯ts across countries, whereas the second base represents
3An exception is the early analysis by Janeba and Peters (1999), which assumes that countries
di®er in the size of their (completely immobile) domestic tax base while competing for a second tax
base that is perfectly mobile internationally. In this model there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies. There exists, however, a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies that is analyzed by
Wilson (2005). Wilson shows that whenever the domestic tax base has some degree of international
mobility, the abolition of tax preferences reduces expected revenue, in line with the result in Keen
(2001).
4See Wilson (1999) for a survey. More recently, Hong and Smart (2005) and Slemrod and Wilson
(2006) have evaluated the e®ects that the presence of small tax havens has on global welfare, with
opposite conclusions being reached in the two analyses.
2the pro¯ts of smaller ¯rms, which can invest abroad but have fewer possibilities for
international pro¯t shifting. The aggregate supply of each capital tax base is ¯xed.
Each type of capital is combined with sector-speci¯c labor that is immobile across
countries. The smaller country A has the same share of workers in each sector; hence si
bears no subscript. Shares sum to unity, sA+sB = 1. We employ the per-capita notation
that is customary in the analysis of countries of di®erent size and let ki
n denotes the
per-capita employment of the capital base n in country i. Hence market clearing for







n = ¹ kn 8 n 2 f1;2g: (1)
where ¹ kn is the ¯xed supply of tax base n. To arrive at reduced-form expressions in
our analysis we assume that the production functions in both sectors n 2 f1;2g are
quadratic. The production functions di®er across sectors but, for each sector, are the
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n 8 i 2 fA;Bg; n 2 f1;2g: (2)
The slope parameter bn may di®er between tax bases.
Following a standard procedure in the literature, we assume that taxes are levied as
source-based unit taxes on capital. Without loss of generality, we impose as well the
normalization on units of quantity that
a1 ¡ b¹ k1 = a2 ¡ b¹ k2 : (3)
Together with the assumption of quadratic technologies, this normalization ensures
that equal unit taxes on each type of capital are equivalent to equal ad valorem tax
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i) 8 i;j 2 fA;Bg;i 6= j; n 2 f1;2g: (5)
Di®erentiating ki
n in (5) with respect to ti shows that the response of either capital tax
base to a tax change is larger, in per-capita terms, for the smaller country A. From (5),
3the net return to capital of type n, rn = f0(kA
n) ¡ tA
n = f0(kB
n ) ¡ tB
n must be







As in Keen (2001), governments are assumed to maximize tax revenues. In the bench-
mark case, each government is allowed to levy di®erentiated tax rates (subscript D)











2 8 i 2 fA;Bg: (6)
Substituting capital tax bases from (5) and di®erentiating with respect to ti
n yields








bn¹ kn (1 + sB)
3sAsB 8 n: (7)
In each country, the tax rate on tax base n, expressed as a fraction of its gross return,
will be proportional to the elasticity of that return with respect to the supply of capital.
The \more mobile" tax base is the one for which bn¹ kn is lower, implying a greater
sensitivity of capital supply to its net return. Moreover, the equilibrium tax rates
show that the smaller country (country A) levies the lower tax rate on each tax base n.
Finally, and importantly, it follows from (7) that the large and the small country choose
the same ratio of tax rates, ti
1=ti
2, and hence grant the same relative tax advantage to







(sj ¡ si)(1 ¡ si)
3sAsB
¸
¹ kn 8 i;j 2 fA;Bg;i 6= j; n 2 f1;2g; (8)
implying that country i gets the same share of each tax base, with the smaller country
getting the larger share.
Substituting the optimal non-cooperative tax rates (7) along with the tax base expres-
sions (8) in the objective function (6) gives optimized per-capita tax revenue in each










































Hence, per-capita tax revenue is higher in the smaller country. This corresponds to the
well-known result that the small country achieves a higher welfare level in the Nash
equilibrium than its larger neighbor (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991).
43 Introducing a non-discrimination constraint
We now consider the case where each country must levy a uniform tax rate (subscript
U) on the two capital tax bases. This captures the constraint that tax preferences for
the more mobile type of capital are abolished, while leaving each country full autonomy








2) 8 i: (11)
Tax bases are again given by (5). Substituting into (11) and di®erentiating with respect
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b1b2(¹ k1 + ¹ k2)(1 + sB)
3sAsB (b1 + b2)
: (12)
Again, the smaller country A chooses the lower tax rate in equilibrium.
Substituting each country's non-cooperative tax rate (12) and (5) into (11) gives opti-
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9sA(sB)2 (b1 + b2)
: (13)
Comparing the two expressions in (13) shows that per-capita tax revenue is again
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B) > 0: (14)
The core question is whether tax revenues in each country are raised or lowered when
the non-discrimination rule is introduced. In contrast to the symmetric case, we must
also consider the possibility that one country gains, but the other country loses from the
constraint to set a uniform tax rate on both capital tax bases. Forming the di®erence













9sA(sB)2 ­ ; (15)
where the common factor ­ is given by
­ =
(b1¹ k1 ¡ b2¹ k2)2
(b1 + b2)
¸ 0:
This expression must be non{negative, and will equal zero only if b1¹ k1 = b2¹ k2. As in
Keen (2001), the uniformity constraint will not a®ect tax revenues if both tax bases
5are equally mobile, so that no preferences arise in the unconstrained equilibrium. Oth-
erwise, both countries lose from the non-discrimination constraint and Keen's ¯nding
generalizes to the case where countries di®er in size. To understand the intuition for
this result, it is useful to start with the benchmark case of symmetric countries. In
this case both countries raise the tax rate on the more mobile base due to the non-
discrimination constraint, but also reduce the tax rate on the less mobile base, relative
to the case of di®erentiated tax setting. As the tax rate on the more mobile base is
increased, it becomes more attractive to compete for this base.5 Hence tax competition
will be intensi¯ed, on average, and the uniform tax rate will be below the (arithmetic)
average of the di®erentiated tax rates.6
This reasoning continues to hold when countries di®er in size. Recall from (7) that, if
tax discrimination is allowed, the ratio of tax rates ti
1=ti
2 and thus the degree of tax
discrimination is the same in both countries. Therefore, the restriction to impose a uni-
form tax rate will a®ect both countries symmetrically. Revenue changes are thus solely
determined by the adjustment in the average rate of capital taxation and equilibrium
tax revenue will fall in both countries as a result of the non-discrimination constraint.
4 Conclusion
In this note we have extended Keen's (2001) analysis of symmetric tax competition
under discriminatory and non-discriminatory tax regimes to allow for size di®erences
between countries. In both regimes the well-known result reappears that the smaller
country levies lower tax rates than its larger neighbor and a redistribution of tax rev-
enues occurs, in the Nash equilibrium, from the larger to the smaller country. Never-
theless, a non-discrimination policy will have similar e®ects as in the symmetric model:
it reduces the average level of capital taxation and thus tax revenues in both countries.
This result is relevant for the non-discrimination policies enacted at the OECD and
EU levels, which are primarily targeted at the tax practices of small countries and
territories. It reinforces the warning that such partial coordination policies can be
welfare-reducing when countries are free to set (uniform) tax rates independently. It
5See Janeba and Smart (2003, p. 266), who term this the `strategic e®ect' of the restriction.
6This follows directly from (15) and the fact that the aggregate tax base ki
1 + ki
2 is the same for
each country in the discriminatory and non-discriminatory regimes. The proof is available from the
authors upon request.
6should be emphasized, however, that our ¯ndings do not invalidate the arguments raised
in the literature in favor of a ban on tax discrimination (see Janeba and Smart, 2003;
Haupt and Peters, 2005; Bucovetsky and Hau°er, 2006). Instead the main purpose of
our analysis has been to show that the symmetry assumption used in much of this
literature is perhaps less crucial than ¯rst intuition may suggest.
7References
Bucovetsky, S. (1991), Asymmetric tax competition. Journal of Urban Economics 30,
167-181.
Bucovetsky, S. and A. Hau°er (2006), Tax competition when ¯rms choose their or-
ganizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed? Revised,
York University and University of Munich.
Haupt, A. and W. Peters (2005), Restricting preferential tax regimes to avoid harmful
tax competition. Regional Science and Urban Economics 35, 493-507.
Hines, J.R. (2005), Corporate taxation and international competition. Ross School of
Business Paper 1026. University of Michigan.
Hong, Q. and M. Smart (2005), In praise of tax havens: International tax planning
and foreign direct investment. Mimeo, University of Toronto.
Kanbur, R. and M. Keen (1993), Jeux sans frontiµ eres: Tax competition and tax coor-
dination when countries di®er in size. American Economic Review 83, 877-892.
Janeba, E. and W. Peters (1999), Tax evasion, tax competition and the gains from
nondiscrimination: The case of interest taxation in Europe. The Economic Jour-
nal 109, 93-101.
Janeba, E. and M. Smart (2003), Is targeted tax competition less harmful than its
remedies? International Tax and Public Finance 10, 259-280.
Keen, M. (2001), Preferential regimes can make tax competition less harmful. National
Tax Journal 54, 757-762.
OECD (1998), Harmful tax competition: An emerging global issue. Paris.
OECD (2000), Towards global tax co-operation. Progress in identifying and eliminat-
ing harmful tax practices. Paris
Primarolo Report (1999), Report from the Code of Conduct Group to the ECOFIN
Council. Brussels, 29 November 1999.
Slemrod, J.B. and J.D. Wilson (2006), Tax competition and parasitic tax havens.
NBER Working Paper No. W12225.
8Wilson, J.D. (1991), Tax competition with interregional di®erences in factor endow-
ments. Regional Science and Urban Economics 21, 423-451.
Wilson, J.D. (1999), Theories of tax competition. National Tax Journal 52, 269-304.
Wilson, J.D. (2005), Tax competition with and without preferential treatment of a
highly-mobile base. In: J. Alm, J. Martinez-Vazquez and M. Rider (eds.), The
challenges of tax reform in a global economy, 193-206. Springer.
9CESifo Working Paper Series 




1784 Paolo M. Panteghini, A Simple Explanation for the Unfavorable Tax Treatment of 
Investment Costs, August 2006 
 
1785 Alan J. Auerbach, Why have Corporate Tax Revenues Declined? Another Look, August 
2006 
 
1786 Hideshi Itoh and Hodaka Morita, Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the 
Holdup Problem, August 2006 
 
1787 Rafael Lalive and Alejandra Cattaneo, Social Interactions and Schooling Decisions, 
August 2006 
 
1788 George Kapetanios, M. Hashem Pesaran and Takashi Yamagata, Panels with 
Nonstationary Multifactor Error Structures, August 2006 
 
1789 Torben M. Andersen, Increasing Longevity and Social Security Reforms, August 2006 
 
1790 John Whalley, Recent Regional Agreements: Why so many, why so much Variance in 
Form, why Coming so fast, and where are they Headed?, August 2006 
 
1791 Sebastian G. Kessing and Kai A. Konrad, Time Consistency and Bureaucratic Budget 
Competition, August 2006 
 
1792 Bertil Holmlund, Qian Liu and Oskar Nordström Skans, Mind the Gap? Estimating the 
Effects of Postponing Higher Education, August 2006 
 
1793 Peter Birch Sørensen, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They?, August 
2006 
 
1794 Michael Kosfeld, Akira Okada and Arno Riedl, Institution Formation in Public Goods 
Games, September 2006 
 
1795 Marcel Gérard, Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, a 
Tentative Appraisal, September 2006 
 
1796 Louis Eeckhoudt, Béatrice Rey and Harris Schlesinger, A Good Sign for Multivariate 
Risk Taking, September 2006 
 
1797 Dominique M. Gross and Nicolas Schmitt, Why do Low- and High-Skill Workers 
Migrate? Flow Evidence from France, September 2006 
 
1798 Dan Bernhardt, Stefan Krasa and Mattias Polborn, Political Polarization and the 
Electoral Effects of Media Bias, September 2006 
 
  
1799 Pierre Pestieau and Motohiro Sato, Estate Taxation with Both Accidental and Planned 
Bequests, September 2006 
 
1800 Øystein Foros and Hans Jarle Kind, Do Slotting Allowances Harm Retail Competition?, 
September 2006 
 
1801 Tobias Lindhe and Jan Södersten, The Equity Trap, the Cost of Capital and the Firm’s 
Growth Path, September 2006 
 
1802 Wolfgang Buchholz, Richard Cornes and Wolfgang Peters, Existence, Uniqueness and 
Some Comparative Statics for Ratio- and Lindahl Equilibria: New Wine in Old Bottles, 
September 2006 
 
1803 Jan Schnellenbach, Lars P. Feld and Christoph Schaltegger, The Impact of Referendums 
on the Centralisation of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach, 
September 2006 
 
1804 David-Jan Jansen and Jakob de Haan, Does ECB Communication Help in Predicting its 
Interest Rate Decisions?, September 2006 
 
1805 Jerome L. Stein, United States Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control 
Analysis, September 2006 
 
1806 Friedrich Schneider, Shadow Economies and Corruption all over the World: What do 
we really Know?, September 2006 
 
1807 Joerg Lingens and Klaus Waelde, Pareto-Improving Unemployment Policies, 
September 2006 
 
1808 Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Raymond Vreeland, Does Membership on 
the UN Security Council Influence IMF Decisions? Evidence from Panel Data, 
September 2006 
 
1809 Prabir De, Regional Trade in Northeast Asia: Why do Trade Costs Matter?, September 
2006 
 
1810 Antonis Adam and Thomas Moutos, A Politico-Economic Analysis of Minimum Wages 
and Wage Subsidies, September 2006 
 
1811 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Christoph Hanck, Cointegration Tests of PPP: Do they 
also Exhibit Erratic Behaviour?, September 2006 
 
1812 Robert S. Chirinko and Hisham Foad, Noise vs. News in Equity Returns, September 
2006 
 
1813 Oliver Huelsewig, Eric Mayer and Timo Wollmershaeuser, Bank Behavior and the Cost 
Channel of Monetary Transmission, September 2006 
 
1814 Michael S. Michael, Are Migration Policies that Induce Skilled (Unskilled) Migration 
Beneficial (Harmful) for the Host Country?, September 2006  
1815 Eytan Sheshinski, Optimum Commodity Taxation in Pooling Equilibria, October 2006 
 
1816 Gottfried Haber and Reinhard Neck, Sustainability of Austrian Public Debt: A Political 
Economy Perspective, October 2006 
 
1817 Thiess Buettner, Michael Overesch, Ulrich Schreiber and Georg Wamser, The Impact of 
Thin-Capitalization Rules on Multinationals’ Financing and Investment Decisions, 
October 2006 
 
1818 Eric O’N. Fisher and Sharon L. May, Relativity in Trade Theory: Towards a Solution to 
the Mystery of Missing Trade, October 2006 
 
1819 Junichi Minagawa and Thorsten Upmann, Labor Supply and the Demand for Child 
Care: An Intertemporal Approach, October 2006 
 
1820 Jan K. Brueckner and Raquel Girvin, Airport Noise Regulation, Airline Service Quality, 
and Social Welfare, October 2006 
 
1821 Sijbren Cnossen, Alcohol Taxation and Regulation in the European Union, October 
2006 
 
1822 Frederick van der Ploeg, Sustainable Social Spending in a Greying Economy with 
Stagnant Public Services: Baumol’s Cost Disease Revisited, October 2006 
 
1823 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk, Cross-Border Mergers & 
Acquisitions: The Facts as a Guide for International Economics, October 2006 
 
1824 J. Atsu Amegashie, A Psychological Game with Interdependent Preference Types, 
October 2006 
 
1825 Kurt R. Brekke, Ingrid Koenigbauer and Odd Rune Straume, Reference Pricing of 
Pharmaceuticals, October 2006 
 
1826 Sean Holly, M. Hashem Pesaran and Takashi Yamagata, A Spatio-Temporal Model of 
House Prices in the US, October 2006 
 
1827 Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Inequality and the US Import Demand 
Function, October 2006 
 
1828 Eytan Sheshinski, Longevity and Aggregate Savings, October 2006 
 
1829 Momi Dahan and Udi Nisan, Low Take-up Rates: The Role of Information, October 
2006 
 
1830 Dieter Urban, Multilateral Investment Agreement in a Political Equilibrium, October 
2006 
 
1831 Jan Bouckaert and Hans Degryse, Opt In Versus Opt Out: A Free-Entry Analysis of 
Privacy Policies, October 2006 
  
1832 Wolfram F. Richter, Taxing Human Capital Efficiently: The Double Dividend of 
Taxing Non-qualified Labour more Heavily than Qualified Labour, October 2006 
 
1833 Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein, Who’s Afraid of Foreign Aid? The Donors’ 
Perspective, October 2006 
 
1834 Dirk Schindler, Optimal Income Taxation with a Risky Asset – The Triple Income Tax, 
October 2006 
 
1835 Andy Snell and Jonathan P. Thomas, Labour Contracts, Equal Treatment and Wage-
Unemployment Dynamics, October 2006 
 
1836 Peter Backé and Cezary Wójcik, Catching-up and Credit Booms in Central and Eastern 
European EU Member States and Acceding Countries: An Interpretation within the 
New Neoclassical Synthesis Framework, October 2006 
 
1837 Lars P. Feld, Justina A.V. Fischer and Gebhard Kirchgaessner, The Effect of Direct 
Democracy on Income Redistribution: Evidence for Switzerland, October 2006 
 
1838 Michael Rauscher, Voluntary Emission Reductions, Social Rewards, and Environmental 
Policy, November 2006 
 
1839 Vincent Vicard, Trade, Conflicts, and Political Integration: the Regional Interplays, 
November 2006 
 
1840 Erkki Koskela and Mikko Puhakka, Stability and Dynamics in an Overlapping 
Generations Economy under Flexible Wage Negotiation and Capital Accumulation, 
November 2006 
 
1841 Thiess Buettner, Michael Overesch, Ulrich Schreiber and Georg Wamser, Taxation and 
Capital Structure Choice – Evidence from a Panel of German Multinationals, November 
2006 
 
1842 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Alexandros Kontonikas, The Euro and Inflation 
Uncertainty in the European Monetary Union, November 2006 
 
1843 Jan K. Brueckner and Ann G. Largey, Social Interaction and Urban Sprawl, November 
2006 
 
1844 Eytan Sheshinski, Differentiated Annuities in a Pooling Equilibrium, November 2006 
 
1845 Marc Suhrcke and Dieter Urban, Are Cardiovascular Diseases Bad for Economic 
Growth?, November 2006 
 
1846 Sam Bucovetsky and Andreas Haufler, Preferential Tax Regimes with Asymmetric 
Countries, November 2006 